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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In the third paragraph of this section of Appellee's Brief, it is asserted that the issue 
substantively is "whether the court ruled correctly as a matter of law that Mr. Hansen was not an 
at will employee". Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court undertook to rule on that 
issue as a matter of fact and that this was error, as it was a question of feet for the jury to decide, 
hence this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant cited on page 6 of his brief that the determinative law was Rule 56, U. C. R. P., 
hence Appellees assertion the Appellee (sic) identifies no controlling rules, regulations, statutes or 
constitutional provisions is not so. (See Page 1 of Appellee's Brief) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Substantially correct. 
B. Correct. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Correct 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under this heading, Appellant's Brief on Page 8 argues that Plaintiff was never an "at 
will" employee because of an express oral contract entered into in 1990, which set forth the length 
of his employment (during physical and mental abilities). 
ARGUMENT 
On this subject, Appellee argues (See Page 2 of Appellee's Brief) as follows: 
^(Appellant's) argument beginning on page 9 is to state the conclusion that summary judgement 
was not appropriate, and then to recite at length quotations from a variety of cases stating the 
standard of review for summary judgement". In the next paragraph of Appellee's Brief it refers to 
page 14 of Appellant's Brief wherein Appellant argues that Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the 
issue of whether or not he was an "at will employee". Thus, it is clear that the brief in question 
3 
not only supplied the argument on which it was based, but set forth the authorities in support 
thereof, hence there has been no "dumping" here, such as was described in the case Crossroads 
Plaza Association v. Pratt. 912 P 2nd, 961 (Utah 1996) (the term "dump" comes from Appellee's 
brief, not from the Court opinion (See Addendum No. 1). 
The next case dealt with in Appellee's Brief is Astil v. Clark. 956 P 2nd, 081 (Utah App. 
1998). There, the Court would not consider application of a California jury instruction to that 
case where "no analysis or legal authority" was presented to the Appellate Court (P. 1089). Said 
case is clearly distinguishable from the instant one as no jury instruction "in case of remand" is 
sought here, and none are presented here, as was the case there. 
As for Butler. 909 P 2nd, 225, the next case cited by Appellee, requires a marshalling of 
evidence by the Appellant in challenging the accuracy and sufficiency of evidence underlying the 
trial court's findings of fact. Here, the trial court made no findings of fact, but only a conclusion 
of law, to wit: that Appellant was an "at will employee". It is clear that Appellee so understood 
the subject brief because in bold print on page 5 it states "B. Mr. Hansen was an At Will 
Employee as a Matter of Law". The last sentence of the fourth paragraph of Appellee's Brief 
(Page 6), thereunder states "In the language of Rule 56, the claims failed for a lack of any genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether an "at will" relationship existed". The "claims failed" must 
refer to Appellant's claim that he was entitled to a trial on any material fact in dispute, and 
Appellee claims that there was none. However, that "begs the question", because the issue is 
whether or not there is a material fact in dispute, and not whether there must be a trial if such a 
factual dispute exists. 
As for cases: A. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores Inc. 972 P 2nd 395 (Utah 1998), B. Fox v. 
MCI Communications Corp. 931 P 2nd 857 (Utah 1997), and C. Sorensen v. Kennecott Utah 
Copper Corp. 873 P 2nd 1311 (Utah 1991), (See Table of Authorities in Appellee's Brief), 
Appellant acknowledges (as those cases so held) that it is his burden to prove that an "at will" 
contract did not exist, but contends he is entitled to prove such at trial, and that the existence of 
such a relationship can not be decided as a matter of law in the face of his affidavit that there was 
an express oral contract entered into in 1990 that would endure as long as he was healthy enough 
to fullfill his duties under that contract. 
CONCLUSION 
There are questions of fact as to whether the Appellant was an "at will" employee and 
whether Appellee was entitled to Summary Judgement as a mater of law. Thus, Summary 
Judgement was not proper. It should be over-ruled and the case remanded to the trial court for 
trial and disposition. 
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Dated this day of May, 1999. 
Robert B. Hansen, Pro Se 
Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Copy of opinion in the case of Crossroads Plaza Association v. Pratt, 912 P 2nd, 
961 (Utah 1996). 
Summary of Arguments and Detail of Arguments, Pages 8-14 of Appellant's 
Brief. 
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Utah 961 
ftback. Applying Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-
Sl02 to -103, the Court of Appeals af-
]aed the Commission's declaratory order 
bthe proposed transaction would be sub-
I^to Utah sales tax. Matrix Funding 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 
^833-34 (Utah CtApp.1994). We granted 
Uorari to review that decision. However, 
ause of an amendment to the tax code in 
; dealing specifically with the taxability of 
-leaseback transactions, we hold that this 
»is moot. 
fi-
ll, 2] As a matter of sound jurispruden-
policy, courts refrain from adjudicating 
issues when the underlying case is 
"A case is deemed moot when the 
uested judicial relief cannot affect the 
fcts of the litigants." Burkett v. Schwendi-
773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); see also 
Schumvdiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 
,1986); Black v. Alpha Fin Corp., 656 
;409, 410-11 (Utah 1982); Wh Street 
"' w. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998 n. 
t CtApp.1993). 
atrix requested a declaratory order from 
[Tax Commission based on a proposed 
L to enter into a sale-leaseback arrange-
with an unspecified customer. The 
purpose of the arrangement was to 
security for a loan from Matrix. In 
tigs before the Commission and 
> the Court of Appeals, the parties stip-
that the issue related to a purely 
ve arrangement. That status was 
in the briefs and at oral argument 
Sfthis Court. 
kThe hypothetical posture of a case 
»by itself, prevent us from reviewing 
strative declaratory order. Pursu-
he Utah Administrative Procedures 
*] declaratory order has the same 
ttd binding effect as any other order 
1
 an adjudicative proceeding." Utah 
§ 63-46b-21(6)(d). For example, 
^Street GaUeria, 860 P.2d at 998 n. 4, 
' of Appeals reviewed a ruling of the 
ssion even though no tax was 
^because the question of whether tax 
?ould be incurred for similar activi-
!
 future constituted a genuine con-
L^ject to adjudication. 
[4] However, effective July 1, 1995, the 
Legislature amended provisions of the tax 
code to specifically address the issue of 
whether sale-leaseback transactions were 
subject to the sales tax. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-102(13)(c) (Supp.1995). This provi-
sion applies to the type of sale-leaseback 
transaction at issue in this case. Neither the 
Tax Commission, nor the Court of Appeals in 
reviewing the decision of the Tax Commis-
sion, addressed the issue in light of the 1995 
amendment because it had not yet been en-
acted. A decision by this Court addressing 
the hypothetical transaction presented to the 
Commission on the basis of the pre-1995 law 
could not decide the taxability of a future 
sale-leaseback transaction between Matrix 
and its customers. Thus, a decision by this 
Court could not affect any legal rights or 
duties of the parties and in a literal sense 
would be a meaningless judicial act. For 
that reason, we hold that the case is moot. 
See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 
(Utah 1989). 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., and BEN H. HADFIELD, 
District Judge, concur. 
RUSSON, J., having disqualified himself, 
does not participate herein; BEN H. 
HADFIELD, District Judge, sat. 
E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
» ^ ^ » " ^ ^ ^ i ^ 
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATION, a 
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Gary PRATT, in his official capacity only, 
and Salt Lake County, Defendants, Ap-
pellants, and Cross-Appellees. 
No. 940454. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 22, 1996. 
Corporate taxpayer sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief from real property taxes 
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imposed by county on leasehold improve-
ments made to taxpayer's real property by 
lease of that property. The District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., 
granted taxpayer summary judgment, and 
county appealed. The Supreme Court, Rus-
son, J., held that: (1) rule that leasehold 
improvements under control of lessee shall 
be taxed as personal property of lessee made 
owners of underlying real property ultimate-
ly responsible for taxes on such improve-
ments; (2) "leasehold improvements" were 
real property for real property tax purposes; 
and (3) property was "improvement" to real 
property if it was erected upon or affixed to 
land. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=*842(1) 
Because challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review only questions of law, 
reviewing court accords no deference to trial 
court's conclusions but reviews them for cor-
rectness. 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3>390.1 
It is longstanding principle of adminis-
trative law that agency's rules must be con-
sistent with its governing statutes. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>390.1 
Administrative rule out of harmony or in 
conflict with express provisions of statute 
would in effect amend that statute. 
4. Taxation @=»65 
Tax commission rule that leasehold im-
provements under control of lessee shall be 
taxed as personal property of lessee did not 
transform improvements into personal prop-
erty, such that they could only be taxed to 
lessee, but rather, consistent with enabling 
statutes, made improvements taxable in way 
or manner in which personal property was 
taxed, and therefore owners of underlying 
real property were ultimately liable for taxes 
due on such improvements. U.C.A.1953, 59-
2-303, 59-2-1326; Utah Admin. Code R884-
24P-32(B). 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>412.1 
Rules made in exercise of power dele-
gated by statute should be construed togeth-
er with statute to make, if possible, effectual 
piece of legislation in harmony with common 
sense and sound reason. 
6. Statutes @=»188 
In interpreting statutes, courts look to 
plain meaning of language at issue to discern 
legislative intent. 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>390.1 
Agency rule cannot trump statutory pro-
vision. 
8. Taxation @=>65 
"Leasehold improvements" were real 
property for real property tax purposes, so 
as to make applicable statute which provided 
that tax due upon improvements upon real 
property assessed to person other than own-
er of real property was lien upon property 
and improvements. U.CA1953, 59-2-1325; 
U.CJU953, 59-2-102(11) (1994). 
9. Taxation <3=>65 
Test of whether property is "improve-
ment" to real property for real property tax 
purposes is whether it is erected upon or 
affixed to the land, rather than test used in 
mechanic's lien cases. U.C.A.1953, 59-2-
102(11) (1994). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
10. Taxation <&=>65 
If real property underlying improvement 
is building or other improvement, this satis-
fies statutory requirement that property con-
stituting improvement be affixed "to the 
land" for purposes of real property taxation. 
U.CJU953, 59-2-102(11) (1994). 
11. Appeal and Error <&=>756 
Reviewing court is entitled to have is-
sues clearly defined with pertinent authorityJ 
cited and is not simply depository in whicKi 
party may dump burden of argument andj 
research. 
12. Taxation <S=>493.5 
Taxpayer's failure to present any evi-
dence that county failed to give timely notice 
of property tax on leasehold improvements 
rendered issue inappropriate for review. 
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake 
County; Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge. 
Robert B. Lochhead, David F. Crabtree, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Douglas R. Short, Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
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Each year from 1988 to 1990, Bennetton 
filed a personal property affidavit* identify-
ing not only its personal property, but also 
its leasehold improvements, and paid taxes 
on both to Salt Lake County (the County). 
The County collected taxes on the leasehold 
improvements from Bennetton through its 
personal property tax collection system pur-
suant to an administrative rule of the tax 
commission which provides, "A. Leasehold 
improvements under the control of the lessee 
shall be taxed as personal property of the 
lessee." Utah Admin.Code R884-24P-32. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
Crossroads Plaza Association (Crossroads) 
filed an action against Gary Pratt, the Salt 
Lake County Treasurer, and Salt Lake 
County, seeking a declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief regarding taxes imposed by 
Salt Lake County on leasehold improvements 
to Crossroads' real property. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of 
Crossroads. Salt Lake County appeals. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In 1987, Chappell, Inc., a Utah corporation 
dba Bennetton, leased space in the Cross-
roads Plaza Mall to establish a retail clothing 
store. Bennetton made changes to the prop-
erty including the installation of various 
walls, a ceiling, a glass storefront, carpet, 
and granite flooring. In June 1988, the Salt 
Lake County Assessor's office conducted an 
audit of Bennetton's property, categorizing it 
as trade fixtures, computer equipment, and 
leasehold improvements. Subsequently, the 
Salt Lake County Assessor submitted to 
Bennetton a document setting forth the 
leasehold improvements, including the walls, 
storefront, flooring and ceiling, and instruct-
ing Bennetton to indicate the year in which 
they were installed and the cost of installing 
the improvements. On the basis of Bennet-
ton's answers, the assessor determined the 
taxable value of the leasehold improvements. 
*• The affidavit is authorized by section 59-2-
306(1) of the Utah Code, which provides in rele-
vant part, "The county assessor may request a 
signed statement in affidavit form from any per-
In 1991, Bennetton failed to file its person-
al property affidavit. The County notified 
Bennetton of the delinquency and assessed 
taxes against Bennetton based on the previ-
ously submitted affidavits. When Bennetton 
failed to pay any of its 1991 property tax, the 
assessor held a sale of Bennetton's personal 
property to recover the taxes due on the 
personal property pursuant to section 59-2-
1310(1) of the Utah Code, which provides, 
"The [county] treasurer shall collect the tax-
es delinquent on personal property . . . by 
seizure and sale of any personal property 
owned by the delinquent taxpayer." The 
record indicates that the County did not in-
tend to sell any of Bennetton's leasehold 
improvement property. After the sale of the 
personal property, the county assessor 
served notice of the amount of tax due on the 
leasehold improvements to Crossroads, the 
owner of the underlying realty. Crossroads 
filed a written objection with the County, 
arguing that the tax notice was an impermis-
sible double taxation and objecting to the 
County's purported authority for assessing 
the disputed tax to Crossroads. Without 
responding to Crossroads' objection, the 
County subsequently included the disputed 
tax on the leasehold improvements in Cross-
roads' 1992 real property tax notice and 
placed a lien on Crossroads' real property for 
the tax due pursuant to section 59-2-1325 of 
the Utah Code, which states: 
A tax upon real property is a lien against 
the property assessed. A tax due upon 
son setting forth all the real and personal proper-
ty assessable by the assessor which is owned, 
possessed, managed, or under the control of the 
person 
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improvements upon real property assessed 
to a person other than the owner of the 
real property is a lien upon the property 
and improvements. These liens attach as 
of January 1 of each year. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In 1992, Crossroads paid the disputed tax 
under protest and subsequently filed suit 
against the County, claiming that (1) the 
County's demanding payment of the taxes 
due on Bennetton's leasehold improvements 
was a double assessment of property in viola-
tion of Utah law; (2) the collection of the 
disputed tax from a party unrelated to Ben-
netton, to whom the tax was originally as-
sessed, was a violation of Utah law; and (3) 
the levy, assessment, and collection of the 
disputed tax from Crossroads or as part of 
Crossroads' real property tax assessment 
was a violation of Utah law. The County 
responded, claiming that Crossroads, as the 
owner of the underlying property, is respon-
sible for the taxes due on the leasehold im-
provements of its tenants pursuant to section 
59-2-1325 of the Utah Code. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. 
In its motion, Crossroads primarily argued 
that because the leasehold improvements had 
been taxed as personal property under tax 
commission rule 884-24P-32, Crossroads was 
not liable for the tax. During the summary 
judgment hearing, Crossroads stated: "And 
so we have the issue well before us. The 
argument that decides the entire case is 
based entirely on statutory language and on 
the rule promulgated by the Tax Commis-
sion." The court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Crossroads, concluding that 
because the leasehold improvements were in 
the control of the lessee, rule 884-24P-32, 
which provides that leasehold improvements 
be taxed as personal property, applied. The 
court concluded that section 59-2-1325 did 
not apply. On appeal, the County argues 
that the court erred in finding (1) that rule 
884-24P-32 was the governing law, and (2) 
that leasehold improvements are personal 
property and therefore taxable only to the 
leaseholder, not to the owner of the underly-
ing realty. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c); World Peace Movement of 
Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 
253, 256 (Utah 1994). "Because a challenge 
to summary judgment presents for review 
only questions of law, we accord no deference 
to the.trial court's conclusions but review 
them for correctness." Id,; see Schurtz v. 
BMW ofN. Am, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-
12 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
We begin by addressing the apparent dis-
crepancy between tax commission rule 884-
24P-32 and section 59-2-1325 of the Utah 
Code. As did the trial court, we assume for 
the sake of this part of the analysis that the 
property in question was "leasehold improve-
ments." Crossroads argues that under rule 
884-24P-32, "leasehold improvements" are 
specifically taxed as personal property which 
are in the control of Bennetton and for which 
Crossroads is not responsible. That rule 
states: 
A. Leasehold improvements under the 
control of the lessee shall be taxed as 
personal property of the lessee. 
B. If not taxed as personal property of 
the lessee, the value of leasehold improve-
ments shall be included in the value of the 
real property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
On the other hand, the County argues that 
rule 884-24P-32 only describes the method 
by which leasehold improvements" should 
be taxed, without establishing that "leasehold 
improvements" are personal property and 
that the tax on leasehold improvements is 
actually controlled by section 59-2-1325 of 
the Utah Code, which states: 
A tax upon real property is a lien against 
the property assessed. A tax due upon 
improvements upon real property assessed 
to a person other than the owner of the 
real property is a lien upon the property 
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASS'N v. PRATT 
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Uu 
and improvements. These liens attach as 
of January 1 of each year. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court held that rule 884-24P-32 
applied in this case and that section 59-2-
1325 did not apply. The trial court conclud-
ed: "In light of the Court's finding that the 
leasehold improvements were in the control 
of the lessee, [rule 884-24P-32] . . . applies 
in this case Section 59-2-1325 of the 
Utah Code is not a fall-back to the Rule 
promulgated by the Tax Commission " 
The trial court determined that these provi-
sions could not be harmonized and chose to 
apply the rule over the statute. 
[2,3] "It is a longstanding principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules 
must be consistent with its governing stat-
utes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., 
846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993). Further, 
"[a]n administrative rule out of harmony or 
in conflict with the express provisions of a 
statute *would in effect amend that statute/ " 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 532 (Utah 
1994) (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax 
Comm% 12; Utah 2d 42, 45, 361 P.2d 1112, 
1113 (1961JX With these principles in mind, 
we begin our analysis of these provisions. 
[4-6] We first address the County's argu-
ment that rule 884-24P-32 can be read con-
sistently with the tax code and that the trial 
court erred in finding rule 884-24P-32 to be 
the only governing law. " 'Rules made in the 
exercise of a power delegated by statute 
should be construed together with the statute 
to make, if possible, an effectual piece of 
legislation in harmony with common sense 
and sound reason.'" Id. at 527 n. 22 (quot-
ing McKnight v. State Land Bd, 14 Utah 2d 
238, 245, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (1963)). Tax 
commission rule 884-24P-32 was promulgat-
ed pursuant to section 59-2-303 of the Utah 
Code, which sets out the general duties of 
the county assessor. This section states: 
Prior to May 22 of each year, the county 
assessor shall ascertain the names of the 
owners of all property which is subject to 
taxation by the county, and shall assess the 
property to the owner, claimant of record, 
or occupant in possession or control [of the 
property]. 
(Emphasis added.) "In interpreting this 
statute, we look to the plain meaning of the 
language at issue to discern the legislative 
intent." Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hard-
ware v. Tax Comm% 791 P.2d 511, 514 
(Utah 1990). This section specifically allows 
the assessor to assess property to one in 
control of the property. Rule 884-24P-32, 
which provides that leasehold improvements 
under the control of the lessee be taxed as 
personal property of the lessee is consistent 
with this statute. See also Valley Fair Fash-
ions, Inc. v. Valley Fair, 54 CaLRptr. 306, 
307, 245 CalApp.2d 614 (Dist.CtApp.1966) 
(holding that statute similar to section 59-2-
303 authorized assessment of improvements 
to the tenant in control of the improvements). 
The very statute Crossroads seeks to avoid 
provides, "A tax due upon improvements 
upon real property assessed to a person other 
than the owner of the real property is a lien 
upon the property and improvements." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1325 (emphasis add-
ed). It is obvious from the plain language of 
this section that the legislature contemplated 
that a tax on improvements might be as-
sessed to someone other than the owner of 
the underlying property. 
Read consistently with the governing stat-
utes, rule 884-24P-32 does not transform 
improvements into personal property, but 
rather in light of sections 59-2-303 and 59-2-
1325, the rule provides a means of assessing 
such improvements "to a person other than 
the owner of the real property." Thus, 
leasehold improvements taxed "as " personal 
property means that such improvements will 
be taxed "in the way or manner" in which 
personal property is taxed. Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (1984) (em-
phasis added). Moreover, the second part of 
the rule at issue provides, "(B) If not taxed 
as personal property of the lessee, the value 
of leasehold improvements shall be included 
in the value of the real property." Utah 
Admin.Code R884-24P-32(B) (emphasis add-
ed). Because this part of the rule refers to 
leasehold improvements in the context of real 
property valuation, it further indicates that 
the first part of the rule at issue here merely 
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provides for leasehold improvements to be 
taxed in the way in which personal property 
is taxed and can be read consistently with 
section 1325.2 
[7] Tax commission rule 884-24P-32 does 
not contravene the requirement of section 
59-2-1325 of the Utah Code that "a tax due 
upon improvements upon real property . . . is 
a lien upon the property." To the extent the 
trial court found that rule 884-24P-32 con-
trolled the dispute, it erred. An "agency 
rule cannot 'trump' a [statutory provision]." 
Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d at 532 
(Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). Oth-
er jurisdictions have also held that a tax due 
on improvements to real property is a lien on 
that property regardless of whether the local 
assessor may assess the tax to the lessee in 
control of the improvements. For example, 
in Koester v. Hunterdon County Board of 
Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 399 A.2d 656 (1979), 
the court stated: "In Becker the local asses-
sor had for years assessed the value of the 
building to its owner and the value of the 
leased land on which it stood to its owner. 
The Court of Errors and Appeals held that 
notwithstanding this practice, the landowner 
remained liable for the tax on the entire 
parcel including the building " Id. at 662 
(citing Becker v. Mayor of Little Ferry, 19 
A.2d 657, 659 (N.J.1941)). The court in 
Koester went on to hold that separately taxed 
mobile homes on leased property remained 
taxable as real property. Id. at 663. 
[8] To determine whether section 59-2-
1325 applies to Bennetton's leasehold im-
provements, we must determine whether 
"leasehold improvements" are improvements 
to real property for tax purposes. Although 
the tax code does not define "leasehold im-
provements," it does define "improvements," 
which are included in the code's definition of 
"real estate or property."3 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-102(20). "Improvements" include 
"all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, 
and improvements erected upon or affixed to 
2. Crossroads argues that this court does not have 
jurisdiction to invalidate the tax commission rule 
because to maintain a judicial challenge to an 
administrative rule, an aggrieved person must 
exhaust all administrative remedies under the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, which, 
Crossroads argues, the County has not done. 
the land, whether the title has been acquired 
to the land or notv Utah Code Ann. § 59-
2-102(11) (1992) (emphasis added). It is 
clear from this wording that the legislature 
contemplated that improvements might be 
made to property in which types of interest 
other than title may be held. We must 
assume that since the legislature did not 
specifically exclude "leased property" from 
those nontitle lands, improvements to leased 
property are included in this definition. Ac-
cord Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 743 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 
1987) (implicitly holding that structures in 
question were "improvements" even though 
affixed to leased real property); Great Salt 
Lake Minerals & Chems. Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm% 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977) 
(same); see also Utah State Tax Commission, 
Property Tax Division, Personal Property 
Tax Standards 2 (1992) (defining "leasehold 
improvements" to mean ^improvements or 
additions to leased real property that have 
been made by the lessee (tenant)" (emphasis 
added)). 
Because "leasehold improvements" are 
"improvements" and "improvements" are 
real property, "leasehold improvements" are 
real property for tax purposes. Thus, we 
conclude that section 59-2-1325 applies to 
leasehold improvements. "A contrary con-
clusion strains the express language con-
tained [in the statute] and thwarts the impo-
sition of taxes." Great Salt Lake Minerals 
& Chems. Corp., 573 P.2d at 340. Under 
Utah law, when a tax on leasehold improve-
ments is due, section 59-2-1325 of the tax 
code specifies that a lien is placed on the 
underlying real property. We therefore re-
verse the trial court's conclusion that section 
59-2-1325 does not apply to Bennetton's 
leasehold improvements. 
[9] However, because the trial court as-
sumed that the property in question was 
"leasehold improvements" and then errone-
Inasmuch as we find the administrative rule on 
leasehold improvements to be consistent with the 
Tax Code, we do not address this issue. 
3. We construe this definition as applying to "real 
estate" or "real property." 
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASS'N v. PRATT 
Cite as 912 PJ2d 961 (Utah 1996) 
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ously concluded that rule 884-24P-32 estab-
lishes that "leasehold improvements" are 
personal property, it did not reach the par-
ties' arguments as to whether the property in 
question would otherwise qualify as "im-
provements" to real property. Thus, we now 
address the parties' legal arguments as to 
what constitutes an "improvement" to real 
property to guide the trial court's disposition 
of this issue on remand. 
As it did in its motion below, the County 
argues on appeal that the property in ques-
tion was "improvements to real property" by 
virtue of its being affixed to the underlying 
property. The County argues that under 
Utah law, "affixation" is the sole test of 
whether a structure is an improvement to 
real property for tax purposes. Crossroads 
argues, however, that the property in ques-
tion was not "improvements" because it was 
not permanently affixed and it did not mate-
rially enhance the value of Crossroads' prop-
erty. 
Crossroads argues that to be "improve-
ments to real property," structures must 
meet the test set forth in a mechanic's lien 
case, Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley 
Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982). 
Mueller involved a former Utah statute un-
der which unpaid contractors could enforce a 
mechanic's lien upon the real property which 
was improved by their work. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 3&-1-3, 38-1-^ (1953). The statute 
applied only to buildings, structures, or im-
provements to property and did not include 
the installation of equipment or personal 
property. Id. To distinguish between real 
and personal property, the court used a 
three-part test, considering 
"(1) [the] manner in which the item is 
attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether 
the item is adaptable to the particular use 
of the realty; and (3) the intention of the 
annexor to make an item a permanent part 
of the realty." 
Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1283 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting State v. Papaniko-
las, 19 Utah 2d 153, 155, 427 P.2d 749, 751 
(1967)). Mueller affirmed the trial court's 
finding that under the three-part test, the 
equipment in question was personal proper-
ty, not improvements to real property. Id. 
at 1283-85. While this court may have en-
dorsed this test for purposes of a mechanic's 
lien, more recently, in Morton International, 
Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax 
Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 594 (Utah 1991), 
we rejected this type of functional analysis to 
determine whether property is real property 
for taxation purposes. We noted that "the 
case law from other jurisdictions is at best 
conflicting in this area. There are jurisdic-
tions that have not followed a functional ap-
proach in interpreting similar statutes. Fur-
thermore, the jurisdictions that have adopted 
a functional approach have reached conflict-
ing conclusions." Id (footnotes omitted). In 
Morton International, this court upheld as 
reasonable a tax commission determination 
that flooring, walls, and ceiling were real 
property for tax purposes, not equipment 
exempt from sales and use taxes. We rea-
soned that given the inconsistencies between 
the controlling statute and governing rule 
and the conflicting case law, the Commis-
sion's determination was not to be disturbed. 
Id. 
As in Morton International, we decline to 
adopt the test urged by Crossroads. We 
find guidance instead in our past interpreta-
tions of the tax code. "Improvements" in-
clude "all buildings, structures, fixtures, 
fences and improvements erected upon or 
affixed to the land, whether the title has 
been acquired to the land or not." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992) (emphasis 
added). In Nickerson Pump & Machinery 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 30, 
33, 361 P.2d 520, 521-22 (1961), construing a 
former sales and use tax statute, we held 
that water pumps, although installed, did not 
become real property for tax purposes. We 
reasoned that the placement was "incidental" 
to the purpose of the water pumps and a 
"mere convenience for the purchaser because 
of the great weight of the pumps," and we 
compared the pumps to "a massive desk or 
refrigerator built to specifications." Id. 
More recently, however, in Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 
303 (Utah 1992), we recognized there may be 
factual disputes as to the distinction between 
tangible personal property and real property 
and found reasonable a tax commission rul-
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ing that certain items were real property 
"once attached " to the property. Id. at 307 
(emphasis added). Similarly, in another tax 
case, we reiterated that a Utah sales tax 
statute identical to the property tax statute 
at issue in this case defines 'improvements" 
as "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences 
and improvements erected upon or affixed to 
land " Great Salt Lake Minerals & 
Chems. Corp., 573 P.2d at 339 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-3-1(3) (emphasis added); 
see also Valgardson Hous. Sys. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 849 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah CtApp.), 
cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) ("Lan-
guage in Utah tax cases supports the . . . 
'affixation* distinction between tangible per-
sonal property and improvement to real es-
tate."). In light of the plain language of the 
statute and our recent decisions regarding 
"improvements," we now hold that the test of 
whether property is an "improvement" to 
real property for tax purposes is whether it 
is "erected upon or affixed to the land." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992). 
[10] Further, we recognize that while 
"land" is not defined in the tax code, the 
common meaning of the word frequently in-
cludes both land and the structures built 
upon it. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-
2(l)(e) (defining "land" for purposes of cer-
tain construction agreements to mean "any 
real property, including any building, fix-
ture, improvement"); Jeffery v. City of Sali-
nas, 232 Cal.App.2d 29, 42 CaLRptr. 486, 
498-99 (1965) ("land" includes land and im-
provements). Thus, as in this case, if the 
underlying property is a building or other 
"improvement," this satisfies the statutory 
requirement that the property be affixed "to 
the land." 
Crossroads asserts that the property in 
question was not "permanently" attached and 
that in any event it did not add value to the 
Crossroads property. However, the statute 
merely requires that the structure be "erect-
ed upon or affixed to the land" and requires 
neither permanency nor that the improve-
ment materially enhance the value of the 
underlying property. We have previously 
held that simply adding value to property 
does not make a change to real property an 
improvement. See Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 
2d 364, 367, 294 P.2d 703, 705 (1956). Like-
wise, an improvement does not fail to qualify 
as an improvement under the statute merely 
because it fails to add value to the property. 
With respect to Crossroads' "permanency" 
argument, we note that even jurisdictions 
which, by statute, require that improvements 
be "permanently affixed" do not equate per-
manence with perpetuity. See Michigan 
Nat'l Bank v. City of Lansing, 96 MichApp. 
551, 293 N.W.2d 626, 627 (1980) ("It is suffi-
cient if the item is intended to remain where 
affixed until worn out, until the purpose to 
which the realty is devoted is accomplished 
or until the item is superseded by another 
item more suitable for the purpose."), ajfd, 
322 N.W.2d 173 (Mich.1982); San Diego 
Trust & Sav. Bank v. San Diego County, 16 
Cal.2d 142, 105 P.2d 94, 98 (1940), cert de-
nied, 312 U.S. 679, 61 S.Ct. 449, 85 L.Ed. 
1118 (1941) (same). 
Whether property constitutes "improve-
ments" to real property for tax purposes 
depends on whether such property is "erectr 
ed upon or affixed to" the underlying proper-
ty. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992). 
In this case, because the trial court found 
that the property in question was personal 
property as a matter of law, it did not reach 
the question of whether the property in ques-
tion was in fact "improvements" to real prop-
erty. On remand, we direct the trial court to 
determine whether the property in question 
constitutes "improvements" under the "affi-
xation" test we have enunciated. 
CONCLUSION 
[11,12] Under Utah law, leasehold im-
provements are improvements to real prop-
erty for tax purposes. While taxes on 
leasehold improvements may be assessedy 
and collected from the lessee in control of-
such improvements, owners of the unden3&| 
ing real property are ultimately responsibtel 
for taxes due on such improvements undgl 
IN RE KNICKERBOCKER 
Cite as 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996) 
section 5&-2-1325 of the Utah Code.4 In the 
instant case, Crossroads, as the owner of the 
property underlying Bennetton's leasehold 
improvements, is responsible for unpaid tax-
es on such improvements.5 The trial court's 
legal conclusion that the taxes on leasehold 
improvements under Bennetton's control are 
collectable only from Bennetton is in error, 
and therefore, we reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Crossroads and remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
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4. We recognize that this rule as applied to mall 
owners may seem somewhat harsh given their 
particular circumstances with respect to lease-
hold improvements on their property. However, 
a change in the statutory provision underlying 
our decision today is a question properly within 
the province of the legislature.* 
5. We do not address whether the County's action 
in this case amounts to a double assessment of 
taxes. Although Crossroads raises this issue, its 
briefing is inadequate. "[A] 'reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the . . . party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Co. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Petition for formal probate of will was 
filed following death of spouse while divorce 
proceedings were pending, and surviving 
spouse filed actions challenging validity of 
change of life insurance beneficiary, sever-
ance of joint tenancy ownership of marital 
residence, and creation of revokable trust 
agreement. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Leslie A. Lewis, J., granted 
survivor's motion for partial summary judg-
ment, finding that removal of household fur-
nishing was conversion, but, following trial, 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (1995) (quoting State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). For 
the same reason, we do not address whether due 
process problems exist in Crossroads' case. 
We likewise do not address whether the Coun-
ty's failure to give timely notice of the tax on the 
leasehold improvements invalidates any lien that 
would otherwise arise on Crossroads' property. 
We find no evidence in the record that Cross-
roads raised this issue before the trial court, and 
we will not consider it on appeal. Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 
(Utah 1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. 
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
6. Because we reverse and remand, we do not 
reach Crossroads' cross-appeals regarding the 
calculation of interest and fees. 
On the second issue for review, to wit "whether Life Line is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law" the record does not show 
that it is. In fact, Life Line's Memorandum shows (Record 42, 
Par. 9) that durincj 1997 Appellant was on sick leave, and 
Appellant's verified complaint (Record 05, Par. 3) shows an 
express oral contract for an indefinite period of time but 
terminable if Appellant's health rendered him unable to fulfill 
his contract. In £hort, even if the subject employment was "at 
will" the employment contract continued until terminated and 
there is no evidence in the record that it was ever terminated. 
In nearly every summary judgment opinion where such a motion 
was granted the_re is a coupling of a determination of no factual 
issues with a finding that the moving party was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. As noted above, no such coupling 
exists here for reasons stated above. 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant respectfully argues that he was never an "at will" 
employee as the duration of his employment contract was expressly 
dependent upon his health and he was never terminated due to 
physical or mental inability to perform the work he contracted to 
do. Appellee contends otherwise and this creates the questions 
of fact which preclude summary judgment. 
9. DETAIL OF ARGUMENTS 
There was no written agreement which could have conclusively 
settled the "at will11 question, but the oral agreement of the 
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parties set forth its duration (until Appellant was unable to 
carry out his duties) and thus the employer was not able 
"a t ¥ :i ] II " b 3 end the employment contract before its termination 
date and to do so for any reasons of its choosing. 
This factual dispute precluded summary judgment against 
appellant. 
The Utah case most often cited on the issue of summary 
judgment is Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
Some of its progeny and their quotes which Appellant believes are 
applicable to this case are the following: 
ARGUMENT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE 
It is the position of the Appellant that the pleading was of 
such complexity that the litigation before the trial court was 
never in a posture where summary judgment was a pro-remedy. 
THE LAW 
Summary judgment is provided by Rule 56 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) provides: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." 
ln W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1981), this court set forth Utah law on summary 
judgmeri le following language: 
"Motions for summary judgment serve the salutary 
purpose of eliminating the time and expense of a trial 
when a party is entitled to relief on the law as 
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applied to undisputed facts. Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). 
Because the remedy is preemptory, a court in 
considering a motion for summary judgment must view the 
facts and the inferences from those facts in the light 
most favorable to the party moved against. Rich v. 
McGovern. Utah, 551 P.2d 1266 (1976); Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807 (1966); Strand v. Mavne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 
396 (1963); Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 
410 (1959). In all events, *[i]t is not the purpose of 
the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility 
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the 
weight of evidence, ' and * it only takes one sworn 
statement under oath to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of 
fact.1 Holbrook Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1975). Plaintiff has met that requirement in 
this case.,f 
In Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) our 
Supreme Court said: 
"Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 
683 (1960). If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the 
court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 (1977); 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 
(1964)." 
Mountain States Etc. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984): 
"Therefore under Rule 56(c), Utah R.Civ.P., summary 
judgment can be granted only if the record shows that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Doubts, uncertainties or inferences 
concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to 
10 
the court before judgment can be rendered against them 
unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court 
that the party opposing judgment can establish no right 
to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence 
or assess credibility.11 
Later cases have been to the same effect. In Rees v. 
Albertson, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) our Supreme Court said: 
"In consequence of the facts as contended by the 
plaintiff and the principles of law applicable thereto 
as discussed herein, it is our conclusion that the 
summary judgment was improperly granted and that this 
case should be remanded for further proceedings.11 
Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., Utah, 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1980). | 
"It is a well-settled principle of law that summary 
judgment can only be granted when there is no dispute 
as to a material fact. Russell v. Park City Utah 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807 (1966). The purpose of summary judgment is to save 
the expense and time of the parties and the court, and 
if the party being ruled against could not prevail when 
the facts are looked at most favorably for his 
position, the summary judgment should be granted. 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975)." 
In Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) this court said: 
"On this appeal we view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, Durham v. Margetts, 
Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 (1977); Tnorpson v. Ford Motor Co., 
16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964")." 
The summary judgment in the instant case cannot be 
sustained. The allegations, if proven, may support a 
claim in negligence. Moreover, the record reveals 
disputed issues of material facts." 
W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co, Utah 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1981). 
"On a motion for summary judgment, it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evidence 
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concerning such factors, the sole inquiry to be 
determined is whether there is a material issue of fact 
to be decided. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). In making that determination, a court 
should not evaluate the credibility of the witness. It 
is of no moment that the evidence on one side may 
appear to be strong or even compelling, and documentary 
evidence is not dispositive if the intent and purpose 
underlying the documents are at issue. 
Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 122 (Utah 1986). 
"Typically, factual disputes are raised by sworn 
statements. See Holbrook Cc. v. Adams, 54 2 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975). " 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
"In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary 
judgment, we treat the statements and evidentiary 
materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive 
them as the only credible evidence, and we sustain the 
judgment only if no issues of fact which could affect 
the outcome can be discerned." 
"[i]f there is any genuine issue as to any material 
fact, summary judgment should be denied. To 
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, it 
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal 
theory. Indeed, it only requires one sworn statement 
to dispute the claims on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact. In resolving 
the issue, the court does not judge the credibility of 
the claims or the witnesses or the weight of the 
evidence." 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995). 
"In granting summary judgment, it is apparent that the 
trial court gave more weight to some affidavits than to 
others. This was inappropriate at this stage of the 
litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole 
inquiry should be whether material issues of fact 
exist. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sonic Nat'1 Resources Co, 
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)." 
"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to 
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resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to 
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when 
upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the 
party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail. Holbrook Co. v. Adams 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1975). We have additionally held that * it only takes 
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments 
on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact.1 Id." 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 
1996). 
"The Utah Supreme Court recently pointed out that "[o]n 
a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not 
weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist". 
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to 
resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to 
eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial 
when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by 
the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail". 
"Id. at 1101 (quoting Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Moreover, ,r:r only takes one 
sworn statement under oatn to dispute tne averments on 
the other side of tne controversy and create an issue 
of fact'" Id (quoting Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 193) 
(emphasis added)." 
"In the present case, the trial court found facts and 
weighed evidence presented by the parties, which was 
inappropriate in considering a motion for summary 
judgment." 
The question is whether or not the record reveals, through 
pleadings, affidavits and records in the case, a material dispute 
of fact. Here it does. 
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THE FACTS 
The record reveals that at the time of the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment there was before the court an 
affidavit that swore there was an express oral contract which 
rejected an "at-will" employment relationship. Record 95, 96. 
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS 
Only a full-blown hearing at which parties can develop the 
various theories will show the pertinent and relevant facts that 
obviously are involved, and Appellant has a right to a jury trial 
on those issues pursuant to the jury instructions in the Addendum 
hereto. 
10. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
There are questions of fact as to whether Appellant was an 
"at will" employee and whether Appellee was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law that render the granting of the subject Motion 
for Summary Judgment invalid and contrary to law. Said judgment 
should be overruled and the case be remanded to the trial court 
for trial and disposition. 
Respectfully submitted this " day of March, 1999. 
Robert B. Hansen, Pro Se 
838 18r Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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